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Chapter 13
Connectivity in Contiguity: Conventions 
and Taboos of Imitation in Colocated 
Networks
Johannes Glückler and Ingmar Hammer
People and organizations learn from others. Cultures, traditions, opinions, behav-
iors, and technologies spread through imitation. Tarde (1903) was among the first to 
appreciate imitation as a key learning mechanism for inventions in social life to be 
diffused among society (Kinnunen, 1996; Rogers, 1995). Imitation, however, is not 
confined to the mere replication of existing knowledge. The process of imitation 
always implies potential deviation into invention (Barry & Thrift, 2007; Djellal & 
Gallouj, 2014) because the absorption of new knowledge requires learning and, 
hence, conscious recombination of knowledge, an activity that may lead to new 
ideas and new knowledge. Imitation is thus a crucial learning mechanism and a 
valuable source of innovation.
If imitation is such an economic advantage, then what are the conditions that 
favor learning by imitation? Essentially, two powerful perspectives—social net-
works and geography—have been proposed and used to unpack mechanisms of 
learning. Social networks focus on the quality of social relations and the effect of 
connectivity on knowledge outcomes. Geography focuses on the spatial dimension 
of social relations and facilitates theory development on the role that physical con-
tiguity has in knowledge creation and innovation. Both these bodies of literature 
have contributed greatly to the understanding of the interorganizational production 
of knowledge, but few studies have integrated these viewpoints to capture the inter-
dependencies of networks and space (Glückler, 2013a).
In this chapter we combine the network and geographical perspectives to theo-
rize on the interactive effect of connectivity and spatial proximity on mechanisms of 
learning. We specifically examine social tensions generated by imitation among 
firms that are simultaneously in processes of colocation and organizational integra-
tion. This tension arises from the potential conduciveness of different spatial and 
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organizational configurations to different forms of learning. Organizational integra-
tion, for example, typically supports the institutionalization of conventions of col-
laboration and two-way learning, whereas spatial proximity increases the visibility 
and observability among actors and thus leverages the undeniable incentive of com-
petitive, one-way learning. If colocated competitors have agreed to collaborate, the 
key question arises as to how firms manage the tensions of cooperation and compe-
tition that accompany collective learning.
We begin by discussing imitation and invention in terms of the opportunities and 
relative advantages each can offer to learning and innovation. Specifically, we adopt 
a perspective of social conventions to distinguish two practices of imitation: the 
convention of collaborative learning through friendly imitation and the taboo of 
unfriendly imitation in a context of rivalry. We then analyze the conditions govern-
ing different forms of spatial organization for interfirm collaboration and imitation 
processes before we present the research strategy of the mixed-method network 
case study Comra.de, an organized interfirm network of 25 new media technology 
companies in eastern Germany. We follow up with an analysis of the empirical find-
ings on the various mechanisms of interorganizational learning and the imitation 
practices between convention and taboo. The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
consequences for network governance.
 Innovation by Imitation
Inventions are often the result of planned research and development. Although the 
directed search process may not always lead to the expected outcomes, as is the case 
with serendipitous and “false negative” inventions (Chesbrough, 2003, p. 3), 
research and development activities frequently entail high costs, risks, and long 
development phases. Innovation studies suggest that high levels of research and 
development intensity, that is, the allocation of major resources to inventive activity, 
are strongly correlated with a firm’s economic performance (Ahuja, 2000; 
Mansfield, Rapoport, Romeo, Wagner, & Beardsley, 1977). Small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) often try to compensate for their diseconomies of scale by 
building alliances. In network organizations or, more precisely, organized interfirm 
networks (Glückler, Dehning, Janneck, & Armbrüster, 2012), firms are able to 
jointly develop resources that they would not be able to develop alone. So-called 
network goods are one way to achieve common goals that would be unattainable 
without partners. Essentially, network goods are collective outcomes from collab-
orative effort and have the additional advantage of being available to all members of 
a given social group regardless of their individual contributions to the creation of 
those goods (Glückler & Hammer, 2015). Because innovation refers to the process 
of introducing and disseminating new solutions on a market (Akrich, Callon, Latour, 
& Monaghan, 2002), it does not depend on invention alone. Instead, the process of 
imitation by observation offers an additional opportunity to learn from other orga-
nizations and to adopt and create new knowledge.
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Jacobs (1969) draws on car-maker Henry Ford to illustrate that imitation or, as 
she calls it, “economic borrowing” (p. 64), can be a promising, often successful path 
to innovation. Instead of building cars himself, Ford focused on assembling pre-
manufactured components. His innovation was not to create a new car but rather to 
offer to supply each individual component as a replacement part. In a continuing 
imitation process, he went on to build more and more parts himself until his com-
pany finally produced the majority of parts for his famous Model T. Japanese indus-
try also applied imitation strategies to adopt external technologies, gradually 
developing its own competitive technological advantage (Bolton, 1993). The suc-
cess of the Swiss watch-making industry is also the result of an intense period of 
imitation and reverse engineering of French and English watches in the seventeenth 
century (Maillat, Lecoq, Nemeti, & Pfister, 1995). Moreover, imitation is not only 
helpful for followers to catch up within an industry, it is an effective mechanism 
enabling cross-industry innovation (Enkel & Gassmann, 2010). When firms have 
sufficient absorptive capacity, they may detect and transfer to their own industry 
good practices and solutions from related and even unrelated industries. It is this 
unforeseeable potential for learning by imitation that makes the diversity of a city 
so crucial for long-term innovativeness (Jacobs, 1969).
The imitation process comprises three key mechanisms (Malmberg & Maskell, 
2002): variation, observation, and imitation. It starts with variation stemming from 
parallel experimentation and the distributed search for innovations: “the tendency to 
variation is a chief cause of progress” (Marshall, 1890, p. 355). A firm’s ability to 
compete derives from the heterogeneous nature of the solutions that firms create 
based on different competencies, experiences, strategies, and resources. To attain 
this competitiveness, firms need to create new solutions and new combinations of 
existing solutions: 
“Little progress would be made in a world of clones” (Lundvall & Maskell, 2000, p. 364). 
“The blind-variation-and-selective-retention model unequivocally implies that, ceteris pari-
bus, the greater the heterogeneity and volume of trials the greater the chance of a productive 
innovation” (Campbell, 1960, p. 395). 
If there is great variety in the available practices, organizations have the opportu-
nity to identify suitable solutions by using a process of attentive searches and obser-
vations, and in the final stage they can transfer this knowledge to their own company 
by imitating them.
Unlike the generation of knowledge in partnerships, imitation refers to the uni-
lateral transfer of existing solutions from one company to another. Imitation offers 
savings when established practices are transferred. Imitation cuts the costs of typi-
cal trial-and-error used in the research process (Jacobs, 1969). We distinguish 
between two fundamental situations for imitation (Glückler, 2013a). With friendly 
imitation, there is a cooperative transfer of solutions, with the owners of the solu-
tions voluntarily agreeing to transfer them or even actively transferring them out-
right. With unfriendly imitation, the owners of the solutions try to prevent their 
imitation or disapprove of any secret imitation. In this section we investigate the 
circumstances under which imitation processes in a network are viewed as either 
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legitimate and accepted (sometimes even planned) or as contested or sanctioned. 
Both forms of imitation, friendly and unfriendly, reflect the diametric opposition of 
competition and cooperation in a network.
 Conventions of Friendly Imitation
In a cooperative context we assume that organizations and their members establish 
conventions to regulate the process of friendly imitation. Observing the good prac-
tice of others, and actively seeking and requesting aid when transferring existing 
solutions is accepted as legitimate or even as the actual reason for the cooperation if 
the current owner permits a solution to be imitated. According to (Weber, 1922/1978) 
conventions fall on a continuum extending from formal law to traditional customs 
and habits: “an order will be called convention so far as its validity is externally 
guaranteed by the probability that deviation from it within a given social group will 
result in a relatively general and practically significant reaction of disapproval” 
(p. 34).
A convention ranges between social custom and law: Unlike deviation from cus-
toms, deviation from convention is sanctioned; unlike law, a convention lacks an 
authority that enforces compliance to it. A convention thus constitutes an institu-
tional order for exchange between parties to a transaction, creating a mutually sound 
basis for expectations. This order cannot penalize violations of the convention 
through the force of law. Instead, it uses social disrespect. Practices of friendly imi-
tation always occur when one firm takes information or solutions from another firm 
with the latter’s approval. These resources may even be actively provided, often 
without any direct compensation. That kind of transfer to a partner corresponds to 
the economic principle of a gift (Ferrary, 2003), a type of generalized exchange in 
which a transfer is not compensated directly but rather reciprocated over the long 
term, possibly also by other partners (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Examples of 
friendly imitation practices—processes that could lead to imitation—include rec-
ommendations, the exchange of experience or knowledge between employees 
within and between companies, and specialist discussions at trade fairs.
A key factor in maintaining long-term friendly imitation is the convention of 
reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Unlike goods traded on the market, gifts provided in 
networks can seldom be assigned a cash value, and that value often cannot be clearly 
allocated after the exchange. As a rule, reciprocal treatment (Stegbauer, 2011) is of 
fundamental importance in the convention of friendly imitation. Imitating without 
authorization or without providing anything yourself violates the convention. 
Conventions of friendly imitation are the foundations for learning and the rapid 
adoption, recombination, and dissemination of ideas and solutions within networks. 
Ultimately, each organization benefits from the solutions from all the other partners 
in a network, an outcome that offers cost advantages over the long-term innovation 
process. Imitation without immediate interaction may even forge the creation of 
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collective identity, as Staber (2010) has demonstrated for colocated firms in south-
ern Germany.
Imitation practices can always develop if firms and their employees cooperate 
with each other or if meetings offer opportunities for mutual observation. For exam-
ple, projects are key drivers in imitation processes when companies jointly develop 
new knowledge and learn from each other, pooling their expertise to arrive at joint 
solutions. With concrete project results constantly accumulating in the company 
(Ibert, 2004), it should be easy for the project partners to integrate knowledge from 
other organizations in the firm’s own knowledge base. Additional key ways in which 
imitation occurs are employee fluctuation and assignment of employees to multi-
company project teams. When employees change their place of work, they contrib-
ute their own expertise and solutions to the new company (Malmberg & Power, 
2005). As part of the European TSER project, Storper (1999) identified employee 
mobility as the most important mechanism for the regional exchange of knowledge 
between companies. In addition, the opportunities for imitating existing solutions 
are highly varied and are facilitated, for example,
through skilled labour mobility within local labour markets, customer-supplier technical 
and organizational interchange, imitation processes and reverse engineering, exhibition of 
successful “climatisation” and application to local needs of general purpose technologies, 
informal “cafeteria” effects, complementary information and specialized services provi-
sion. (Camagni, 1991, p. 130)
 The Taboo of Unfriendly Imitation
The conventions of friendly imitation are based on agreement and long-term reci-
procity between the partners. There are mutually shared behavioral expectations 
with which network members comply in order to be accepted in the network perma-
nently. If a network member transgresses these conventions, the network members 
will at least disapprove of this behavior and may even sanction it by excluding the 
member from communication within the network (Weber, 1922/1978). However, 
the processes for imitating time-tested solutions are certainly not linked to coopera-
tion: “[N]o trust is required as a prerequisite for learning. The sequence of variation, 
monitoring, comparison, selection and imitation can take place without any close 
contact or even an arm’s-length interaction between the firms” (Maskell, 2001, 
p. 930).
In these situations specific observation methods such as reverse engineering or 
other noninteractive spillover effects (Glückler, 2013a) certainly enable firms to 
imitate and employ tried-and-trusted solutions and innovations from other firms 
without their agreement and knowledge (Minagawa, Trott, & Hoecht, 2007). This 
unapproved acquisition of knowledge is what we call unfriendly imitation. 
Unfriendly imitation violates the convention of eliciting the owner’s agreement 
when adopting solutions from someone else. Although unfriendly imitation is con-
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sidered illegitimate by the originator of the idea or practice, it is still legal as long as 
it does not violate any intellectual property rights. In these situations firms cannot 
influence imitation and the use of their own knowledge by other organizations. In 
open competition and rivalry, unfriendly imitations do not violate any convention 
pertaining to cooperation, loyalty, or reciprocity, and firms simply have to accept 
that fact as a general environmental condition.
By contrast, unfriendly imitation is socially forbidden in cooperative relation-
ships. However, the existence of cooperative or trusting relationships between 
members of a network reinforces the risk of unfriendly imitation. If actors trust in 
the cooperation and the joint work in which they are engaging, they are inclined to 
disclose much more about themselves than they would to competing firms with 
which they have no cooperative relationship. As more information is discovered, the 
risk of unfriendly imitation thus becomes greater in cooperative relationships than 
in open competition. This argument has its roots in the observation that the greatest 
damage from abuse can only arise under conditions of trust (Granovetter, 1985). 
Within cooperative relationships the gravity of this potential harm has institutional-
ized unfriendly imitation as a taboo that should not be broken given the prevailing 
conventions.
 The Geography of Interfirm Relationships
The importance of the processes described above for cooperative and rival learning 
varies according to the underlying conditions for cooperation. The geographic con-
text, for instance, figures prominently in rival learning in particular, affecting the 
capacity to exploit opportunities for imitation. The following section distinguishes 
between three geographic situations—clusters, organized networks, and the special 
form of colocated network organizations—bearing on interfirm relations that play a 
key role in discussing cooperative and rival learning (Fig. 13.1).
Fig. 13.1 Geographic organization of cooperation: Clusters, organized networks, and colocated 
network organizations (From Glückler et al. (2012, p. 168). Reprinted with permission of Springer)
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 Cluster
The cluster concept is associated with two elementary components in the definition: 
a geographical concentration of firms and a functional interrelation between them. 
Porter (1998) defines geographic clusters as regional concentrations of interlinked 
companies that perform similar activities in a common field. These two defining 
elements need to be assessed separately. Local concentration gives firms traditional 
localization advantages deriving from the joint use of infrastructure, labor markets 
and specialized services. The greater the number of a location’s firms that require 
specialist employees, the cheaper and more probable it is that a corresponding seg-
ment of the labor market will form. These traditional localization advantages result, 
in particular, from external economies of scale. Local externalities evoke the theory 
of the club good (Buchanan, 1965), a reminder of why geographic concentrations 
are often referred to as regional club goods (Capello, 1999). The localization advan-
tages work irrespective of any interorganizational action and require only that sev-
eral firms with the same activities be colocated (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002).
The second part of the definition distinguishes between the narrow and the wide 
senses of the term cluster. The former predicates not only a geographic concentra-
tion but also functional links between the firms in a cluster. Concepts for industrial 
districts (Belussi & Pilotti, 2002; Sforzi, 1989) or the creative milieu (Maillat, 
1998), for example, note the importance of cooperation relationships that benefit 
from their proximity and that are often based on trust (Bathelt, 1998). One can use 
transaction-cost theory (Scott, 1988) and the embeddedness approach (Uzzi, 1996) 
to argue that geographic proximity reduces communication costs and that face-to-
face communication promotes the development of binding, trusting, and reciprocal 
relationships (Sabel, 1994). In this regard learning processes are due, in particular, 
to cooperation between local companies along the value chain. Despite the plausi-
bility of the argument, the tendency for a firm to cooperate is often just as strongly 
geared to partners outside its cluster as to those within it. Empirical studies such as 
the software cluster in Darmstadt, southern Germany, show that lead firms and tech-
nology SMEs in the region attach substantially greater importance to strategic alli-
ances with partners outside the region than to local opportunities for cooperation 
(Angelov, 2006). It is clear that functional links in a cluster are not as strong or 
important as supposed in traditional concepts.
Firms in a cluster are consequently a concentration of related activities based on 
a social division of labor between different stages of the value chain and in competi-
tion within the same stage. Malmberg and Maskell’s (2002) knowledge-based the-
ory of clusters thus incorporates the concept of rival learning. The two researchers 
explicitly explore the relative advantage of having a multiform cluster rather than a 
single integrated firm in one place. In the case of full internalization, a single firm 
could exploit internal economies of scale through the reduced unit costs of large 
production capacity, minimize external transaction costs through an authority-based 
governance mode, and smoothly organize the transfer of knowledge under a regime 
of hierarchical control. By contrast, multiple and colocated firms engaging in 
13 Connectivity in Contiguity
276
 parallel and rival experimentation are more likely to generate variations of tech-
niques and solutions that would be impossible within a single firm because of the 
common vision and corporate coherence it needs. This variety increases the oppor-
tunities for each firm to identify and imitate successful practices by attentively 
observing their competitors (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002; Malmberg & Power, 
2005).
There are various mechanisms to promote observation and imitation. One is 
learning-by-hiring (Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003), another is the adoption of new 
information and ideas from the “local buzz” within a communication ecology 
(Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004). Cluster structures favor competition and 
rivalry in these ways because competitors operate under the same environmental 
conditions, meaning that none can credibly claim any advantages—or excuse lag-
gardness—deriving from external factors (Porter, 1998). Consequently, competition 
for innovation focuses purely on a firm’s ability to develop new solutions and launch 
them on the market. Geographic proximity grants many competitors increased vis-
ibility and thus a greater opportunity to imitate new solutions more quickly than is 
likely for a spatially isolated firm. There was once a time when urban variety and 
density were considered the drivers of imitation and the recombination of existing 
knowledge in other sectors or functional areas and when the city was seen as the 
driver of economic innovation (on both counts see Jacobs, 1969). More recently, 
however, proponents of cluster approaches (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002; Porter, 
1998) note that rivalry, observation, and imitation under the same local underlying 
conditions can also be the source of innovation for local production systems outside 
cities and urban regions. Unlike the concept of the industrial district, which high-
lights interactional collaboration, the concept underlying cluster approaches bases 
learning on noninteractional rivalry. In addition, rival learning can explain why 
firms in clusters enter into so few formal cooperations (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002; 
Angelov, 2006).
 Organized Network
Unlike regional clusters, which are often only loosely linked, the organized network 
focuses on actively coordinated interfirm cooperation. We define an organized net-
work as a voluntary and purposive association of members that aligns the multilat-
eral collaboration between a finite number of independent organizations with a 
collectively shared utility (Glückler, 2012). Organized networks serve to generate 
cooperation gains and external savings. They are an organizational instrument for 
constantly reinforcing the competitiveness of the individual members (Araujo & 
Brito, 1997). This networking makes it possible to recombine various kinds of 
knowledge, something that no individual member would achieve in its entirety (von 
Hayek, 1945; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). The tendency to cooperate enables corporate 
networks to offer a backdrop for cooperative learning; they jointly generate knowl-
edge with friendly imitation.
To use the advantages of this cooperation jointly, rules and organs through which 
to implement them are developed by the members as part of their network gover-
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nance. Members undertake to meet the expectations in the network, which are based 
on formal, contractual rules and standards and on established and collectively 
shared conventions. Particular importance is attached to the conventions. A member 
cannot just opportunistically use the knowledge of other members against their will 
and for his or her own purposes without violating the convention and having to fear 
sanctions. Violating a relationship of trust in networks implies far greater conse-
quences than simply the disapproval of the damaged partner. If joint associated third 
parties find out about A’s opportunistic behavior with B, then B as well as all of the 
other partners lose their trust in A (Glückler, 2001). Even though conventions have 
no legal character, their violation entails the risk of being shunned by the commu-
nity or even excluded from it (Weber, 1922/1978). Hence, interfirm networks offer 
a suitable backdrop for cooperative learning in which practices of unfriendly imita-
tion are not only illegitimate but effectively sanctionable.
 Colocated Network Organization
The third context of geographic organization is the locally organized network. It 
includes features of both learning processes, that is, friendly and unfriendly oppor-
tunities for imitation. Outside the strategic alliances established in the network, the 
physical proximity of local companies makes for unplanned personal contact (Rallet 
& Torre, 1999) and many other forms of mutual observation, often dubbed local 
buzz (Bathelt et al., 2004). The simultaneity of geographic proximity and coopera-
tive relationships allows both friendly and unfriendly imitation, albeit in the context 
of a network based on conventions and rules, which sanctions unfriendly imitation 
more strongly than in a geographic cluster. Misbehavior can thus be identified and 
sanctioned with relative ease. Locally organized networks constitute a special type 
of organized network. They link the advantages of physical proximity with the 
advantages of organized cooperation in developing and disseminating innovations. 
The following empirical case study on a network addresses the central issue of colo-
cated network organizations: the perception and regulation of the diametric opposi-
tion that results in locally organized networks when the opportunities for unfriendly 
imitation benefit from physical proximity and when opportunities for friendly imita-
tion benefit from cooperation.
 The Comra.de Network Case Study
 Comra.de: Ideal Type of Local Interfirm Network
Comra.de is an organized network of 25 technology SMEs that offer solutions and 
services for e-commerce and the new media market. The network was established 
in response to the crisis at SellSoft.1 Sellsoft had held a leading market position in 
1 SellSoft is a pseudonym for a large technology company on the new media market.
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the German e-commerce business until the New Economy’s bubble burst in 2003. 
The upheaval led to mass dismissals of employees, many of whom eventually found 
new jobs through a transfer company. The head of the human resources department 
at that time wanted to offer the former employees new perspectives and encourage 
them to form their own companies. The easy access to infrastructure (e.g., office 
rentals and state-of-the-art communication technology) and continual professional 
exchanges were particularly important in this regard. From the outset, these activi-
ties took place in a highly concentrated geographic area, a common office building 
that also houses SellSoft. In 2005 the firms then officially adopted the legal form 
of a cooperative, and the network was formed as an organization. By 2010, Comra.
de had grown from the initial 26 employees to 351 employees. Over the same 
period, SellSoft shrank from more than 1200 to 275 employees, making Comra.
de larger than its former parent.
Comra.de was created without public subsidies, purely on the private initiative 
of the shareholders. As a type of network organization, the cooperative offers the 
advantages of binding its members more strongly than an association, but it is not as 
hierarchically structured as a GmbH (German public limited company). The net-
work is formally governed by the executive and supervisory boards. A member 
company takes on the role of network spokesperson, and membership is due to the 
purchase of units in the cooperative. Each member has one vote, which means they 
have equal voting rights. This formal governance structure guarantees the members 
sufficient flexibility and independence. In addition to the cooperative rental of the 
office property, the individual companies reap collective benefits from bundling 
specialist expertise to solve complex tasks and from pooling capacity to process 
larger orders. As a result, the cooperative can work on the market as an end-to-end 
provider with the greatest possible bandwidth and, for example, pursue joint mar-
keting activities and receive improved purchasing conditions.
Within the cooperative the member firms specialize in different areas of compe-
tence, such as developing software for online shops, mail-order solutions, mobile 
applications, online marketing, and Web design. These competencies are offered to 
SMEs and large enterprises alike. In addition, the network operates as an e-business 
service provider for other cooperatives. In 2007, Comra.de recorded revenues of 
€17.5 million, up 80 % from the previous year. This figure was the largest percent-
age increase in revenues the network had yet achieved. In the following year, reve-
nues totaled €18.1 million; in 2009, €19.2 million (Beck, 2011).
 Method
Comra.de agreed to participate in a network case study from May 2010 to 
September 2011. In preliminary discussions the spokesperson reported a series of 
problems and challenges for work in the network, which finally led him to agree to 
a scientific investigation of organized networks as part of the research consortium 
krea.nets (Glückler et al., 2012). The method for the study was based on the 
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procedure for situational organizational network analysis, SONA (Glückler & 
Hammer, 2012), which integrates qualitative and quantitative research methods in 
six consecutive phases. The case study was based on expert interviews2 with four 
company owners and the network spokesperson, who with his own company is also 
a member of the network. A customized network questionnaire was prepared from 
the interviews and offered to all of the network members for a standardized network 
survey. Of the 25 members invited, 20 participated in the study, a return rate of 
80 %. The data collected in the survey was then evaluated with methods of social 
network analysis (Borgatti et al., 2002). The results of the network analysis and the 
interviews with the individual network members were presented and discussed at 
one of the monthly shareholder meetings to ensure communicative validation of our 
findings. The empirical research and data collection is based on joint contributions 
by Beck (2011) and Hammer, Beck, and Glückler (2012).
 Results
 Breaking Taboos
Friendly imitation is based at least on goodwill, and often also on active support in 
transferring existing solutions to another network member. If companies violate this 
convention through secret, unagreed-on imitation, then conflicts in the network are 
inevitable. But what does breaking taboos look like when it comes to unfriendly 
imitation? The case of Comra.de illustrates the breaking of a taboo. The members 
of the Comra.de network share information on the current trends in the e- commerce 
sector. In late 2010 social network technology was a major issue, so members dis-
cussed how Comra.de could further hone its profile in this area and generate addi-
tional benefits for the network. The discussions led to the idea of developing 
software that would link online shops with the most frequently used social networks 
in the Internet, without this connection having to be initiated. Three of the member 
firms decided to collaborate on a project and jointly implement this idea with a fin-
ished product. A fourth member firm observed their activities and broke the taboo. 
At a trade fair it published a press release stating that it, together with a major com-
petitor outside the Comra.de network, would be the first provider to launch a stan-
dard shop for social networks on the market. However, this member had never 
worked together with the original developers or supported the joint development:
The fourth member did that alone, was not involved in the design and development, and 
didn’t say a word to anyone—“pssst”—and did this secretly with SellSoft, and then pub-
lished the press release on this subject without saying anything to us beforehand. (Member 
of the original development group, November 2010)
2 All of the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded with MAXQDA.
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It was not the first time that this member had used rival learning against other 
members of the network. The chief executive had already attracted attention on 
several occasions in the network with his noncompliant activities. The members had 
repeatedly informed the entrepreneur that his behavior violated the conventions of 
cooperation they had agreed on at one of the cooperative’s monthly meetings. In 
personal discussions, other members attributed the “persistence” of this unfriendly 
imitation to a lack of sanctions on such behavior and the ineffectiveness of the dis-
approval of actually engaging in opportunism. Nevertheless, no attempts were made 
to exclude this member from Comra.de:
This is the legendary black sheep who will always be a black sheep. The fact that this com-
pany has a very similar level of knowledge makes this process [of imitation] much easier. I 
am concerned, once again, about this action. At some point or other he will have to learn—
and yet apparently we haven’t made a major impression—because he has never been thrown 
out. OK, he’s a tenant here, he has a whole floor. If we throw him out, then we have a 
problem. He won’t cease to exist in a city like this, either. He’ll still be there. Until now, we 
thought that we would [keep] that crazy guy under control, give him a bit of guidance and 
influence him. (Network spokesperson, November 2010)3
The analysis of the interviews suggests two findings. First, although the deviant 
firm imitated a potential economic product from its network colleagues, a formal 
exclusion was not possible. According to the network policy that had been formal-
ized and circulated among all members, competition between network members 
must not be hampered under any circumstances. Technically, the instance of 
unfriendly imitation was not a violation of codified rules, for the perpetrating firm 
produced its solution with own resources and partners for their own, separate cus-
tomer. Second, the consequences of excluding the deviant firm from membership 
would have been more serious for the rest of the network than for the black sheep. 
Thus, the other members decided to maintain membership but to withdraw from the 
conventions of cooperation, that is, of exchange knowledge and friendly imitation. 
If they stopped knowledge exchange with the black sheep, they would still benefit 
from observing its activities as long as that member continued to have its offices in 
the same building as they did. The members thereby sanctioned the taboo-breaker 
not by formal exclusion but by articulated disapproval and soft exclusion from inter-
nal forms of cooperation: They no longer invited that member to joint activities and 
excluded it from open knowledge exchange and collaborative projects. Moreover, 
that member was suspended from the “cafeteria atmosphere” at lunch time and from 
unofficial management meetings. As one member firm reported, “[The black sheep] 
will be isolated, and nobody will talk to them any more” (Interview, November 
3 The term “black sheep” was used in this specific case of unfriendly imitation. Actually, both the 
rule-breaking member and the network have been very successful in business. Whereas the net-
work relies on friendly imitation, the deviant member firm relies on a supply network consisting of 
business firms outside Comra.de. At the time of our investigation in 2010 and 2011, this firm 
reported 23 employees but had expanded to more than 100 people by the time of this chapter’s 
publication in 2016. For lack of space in the joint office building, the member chose to resign from 
the network to pursue its own business and growth strategies, upon which it had embarked in the 
previous years.
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2010). It is apparent from discussions with members of the network that violating 
the taboo of unfriendly imitation results in perceptible sanctions against illegitimate 
behavior, in particular through exclusion from the local communication ecology in 
the network. But what are the consequences for the excluded firm? Does the black 
sheep really experience disadvantages from soft exclusion?
 Forms of Cooperation and the Consequences of Breaking 
the Taboo
In the first meeting and in personal interviews, network members highlighted the 
gains from collective learning among members. Employees often asked for assis-
tance, and they exchanged program parts, codes, and other technical or organiza-
tional solutions with employees from other member firms just across the corridor. 
The physical proximity in the same building, together with the related activities of 
the firms in the same field of technology, was found to be a powerful source of col-
laborative learning. The information revealed in the interviews was used to develop 
a specific network questionnaire, which was then used for a network survey to cap-
ture all bilateral relationships across four distinct forms of cooperation among all 
members of Comra.de (see Fig. 13.2).
The first form of cooperation in this multilevel network was the imitation-of- 
solutions network. Firms in the network survey were asked to provide information 
on the use and transfer of solutions from other members.
Over the past four years, have you introduced in your company new features or concepts 
that were developed by other members of Comra.de? Please consider novelties such as 
products, plug-ins, applications, code parts, marketing concepts, and organizational con-
cepts. If this was the case, which companies developed these new features?
The responses were used to construct a network in which each link denoted an 
instance of one member imitating another member’s solution. This type of imitation 
was of no legal relevance with regard to copyright violations. The companies freely 
disclosed their knowledge, and the imitation constituted reuse of artifacts in soft-
ware or the company’s organization, which are very difficult to protect under law.
The second form of cooperation was the knowledge-exchange network. In the 
interviews, members argued that network activities increased their opportunities for 
imitation and information transfer. The companies reported that knowledge was 
regularly exchanged both between employees and at a management level. Employees 
and managers either held informal discussions in the corridors or specifically looked 
for each other to obtain help and advice to solve concrete problems. On the basis of 
these interview descriptions, the members in the network survey were asked to indi-
cate all partners who had helped them solve work-related problems, a proven survey 
item that conveyed valid representations of the knowledge network in previous 
studies (Glückler, 2008, 2013b, 2014; Glückler & Panitz, 2014).
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A third form of cooperation practiced within the network was employee-lending, 
that is, the temporary sharing of employees between the partner firms. Employees 
were used in the partner companies as consultants. When required, they also helped 
with the design of concepts for Internet purchasing systems. The amount of time 
spent as a temporary worker varied greatly. Some consultants were lent only for a 
specific project; others had been cooperating with the partner companies for several 
years. Lending employees was a widespread practice in the Comra.de network. 
The firms were then asked to state those members to which they had already 
deployed employees over the last years.
Finally, the fourth form of cooperation was the project-cooperation network. 
Network members were asked to state those partner firms with whom they had 
Fig. 13.2 Four forms of cooperation in the Comra.de corporate network. From Glückler et al. 
(2012, p. 177). The shaded circle highlights the position of the “black sheep” in the different forms 
of cooperation. Reprinted with permission of Springer
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repeatedly collaborated in concrete projects in the past.4 In professional software 
engineering, particularly in the IT industry, it is standard practice to modularize 
common project outcomes and reuse them in other projects. In the software industry 
joint projects can become a key process for knowledge imitation because developed 
project solutions such as programs, code, or parts of programs and code—so-called 
code snipplets—can easily be reused in other projects.
The imitation network was the most highly fragmented of all the activities. 
Slightly more than half of the members had already used concepts, plug-ins, or code 
sections from other network members for their own operating purposes. This imita-
tion allowed the companies to save development time and to make solutions to 
problems available in the company. Not only was friendly imitation as a network 
activity at a moderate level in the network, it was also the activity with the fewest 
relationships, the lowest density, and a comparatively low number of average rela-
tionships per network member (Table 13.1). The size and similarity of the member 
companies were statistically unrelated to engagement in imitation among network 
participants. In particular, the exchange of knowledge and the cooperation on joint 
projects were the strongest network activities in Comra.de. They included the larg-
est number of members, the greatest density, and the largest number of 
relationships.
What was the position of the deviant firm that had repeatedly broken the conven-
tions of the network? If the firm had really been sanctioned with disapproval and 
exclusion from the communication and cooperation relationships, that status would 
be reflected by a relatively peripheral or even isolated position in the network. 
Indeed, according to its own response and the responses of the other members to the 
items in the survey, the deviant firm was largely isolated from any activity. It did not 
lend any employees to other members, receive any solutions from other companies, 
4 To rule out other explanatory factors, we included many additional variables, such as the entre-
preneurs’ joint history, capital participations between member companies, and company prestige. 
Later analysis showed all these variables to be insignificant, however, so we do not address them 
in depth in this chapter.









 Relationships per 
member (mean)
Imitation 9 0.04 17 0.85
Knowledge 
exchange
7 0.10 38 1.90
Employee-lending 8 0.07 25 1.25
Project 
collaboration
4 0.09 35 1.75
aNetwork density is calculated by dividing the number of observed relations by the number of pos-
sible relationships. Adapted from Glückler et al. (2012, p. 177). Reprinted with permission of 
Springer
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participate in any exchange of knowledge, or cooperate in projects. The company 
was isolated especially from project work and was avoided by all three of the other 
companies. However, the other members of Comra.de reported that the company 
was a source of knowledge and imitable concepts and was a target for their own 
employee-lending. Yet on the whole, the noncompliant firm occupied only a periph-
eral position in the network (Fig. 13.2).
What was the benefit of a peripheral location in an organized network? The 
answer is quite simple: The physical proximity resulting from collective location in 
one building meant that imitation could never be stopped even if communication 
and collective projects and other work was very slow between the rule-breaker and 
all others. Therefore, the black sheep’s continued membership let the other mem-
bers benefit from the increased visibility and monitoring of new technical and 
industry-specific developments.
If there are regular exchanges between 26 or 27 companies, then you are much more on the 
ball than if you were to be in the inner city with a team of 15 employees or in a commercial 
zone. You would never get the same value there. And I certainly don’t mean that negatively, 
but the value of fast exchanges, including at an employee level, that’s something we have 
only here in the network. (Interview with a member of the Comra.de corporate network, 
July 2010)
Despite the deviant firm’s opportunism, the other members exploited the advan-
tages of physical proximity and organizational membership. The fact that the taboo- 
breaker still belonged to the network meant that they believed it legitimate for them, 
too, to observe the company and to imitate its successful practices and solutions 
without approval. On the whole, the network analysis confirms the sanctions of 
disapproval detailed in the interviews, which were expressed by soft exclusion from 
the various forms of internal cooperation rather than by exclusion from membership 
altogether. The firm was thus forced into structural periphery of its relational activi-
ties. Despite the short-term advantage of unfriendly imitation, the violation of net-
work conventions must ultimately be viewed as negative on the whole. Breaches of 
taboos place the culture of cooperation at risk, undermining the cooperative core of 
a corporate network. In the following section we analyze the mechanisms of friendly 
imitation, that is, the economic opportunities arising from the combination of con-
nectivity and contiguity.
 Practices of Friendly Imitation
Conventions of friendly imitation are based on either approval or even active sup-
port of one firm’s reproduction of another firm’s solution. Discussions with network 
members left no doubt that the different forms of exchange and cooperation were 
geared to providing other parties with solutions in eventual or immediate exchange 
for help and advice. The imitation network in Fig. 13.2 documents the results that 
relationships have for friendly imitation, but it provides no information on the 
enabling conditions. Network-related statistical methods can be used to investigate 
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whether the various forms of cooperation support imitation, with the imitation net-
work being the dependent variable. The results of a series of multiple network 
regression models (MRQAP, see Krackhardt, 1988) have shown that bilateral proj-
ect cooperation and exchange of knowledge significantly increase the propensity of 
two partners to learn from each other through successful imitation. Model 1 illus-
trates the significant positive association between knowledge exchange and success-
ful imitation (Table 13.2), a finding also reflected by an interview in which a network 
member told of the effect that collaboration had had on imitation.
There is an online shop called Magento…, and all of these member firms that I just men-
tioned use Magento. There’s a lot of transfer here because the employees ask people, “Tell 
me, have you already written a plug-in for Magento? It can do such and such.” And they say, 
“Yes, we’ve done that.” (Interview, July 2010)
As with knowledge exchange, cooperation in projects also promoted imitation 
between companies (model 2). In projects, knowledge from different companies 
was merged and further developed to create new solutions. Companies reported that 
the newly developed solutions were stored not in a joint program library, as is often 
the case in the software industry or development syndicates, but rather in the com-
panies participating in the projects. This practice may be due to two facts: (a) the 
use of standardized shop systems in the e-commerce industry, and (b) the use of 
many different software systems. In the Comra.de network, for example, more than 
six different shop systems were in use, with business firms mastering more than ten 
different development environments if one includes programming language as well. 
Therefore, the joint projects allowed the simplified development of specialist appli-
cations such as the use of new security systems on different standardized systems 
that were equally used by a large number of companies. The new media industry 
was characterized by standardization, modularization, and the accumulation of 
knowledge. However, this knowledge was stored in and used by the individual com-
panies, not jointly (Grabher, 2004). Clearly, projects promoted the transfer of codi-
fied knowledge for the companies involved.
The fact that firms were engaged in employee-lending seems unrelated to the 
probability of their learning from each other (model 3, Table 13.2). The multivariate 
Table 13.2 MRQAP: Effects of forms of cooperation on the dyadic imitation of solutions
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4




Project collaboration 0.327** 0.292**
(0.038) (0.039)
adj. R2 0.153 0.105 −0.001 0.228
p 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.000
aStandard deviations are in parentheses. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.001. N = 20 members, 380 observations, 
5000 permutations. Dependent variable: imitation network. Adapted from Glückler et al. (2012, 
p. 179). Reprinted with permission of Springer
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model 4 encompasses all three levels of cooperation and confirms the combined 
effects of knowledge exchange and project cooperation on imitation relationships. 
In summary, we see that various levels of cooperation and prevailing conventions of 
friendly imitation supported the transfer of solutions between members. This coop-
erative learning promoted the innovative abilities of the individual members and 
was fostered in particular by the mutual exchange of knowledge between the com-
panies and their joint project work.
 Conclusion
Although spatial contiguity and network connectivity have for the most part been 
investigated separately for their role in knowledge creation, we have combined the 
two perspectives to explore the opportunities and tensions that emerge from situa-
tions in which organized connectivity and spatial colocation come together. We 
have argued that connectivity among firms facilitates purposive collaboration and 
forms of friendly imitation, whereas spatial proximity also enhances the mutual vis-
ibility among even disconnected firms and thus increases the incentives for 
unfriendly forms of rival learning and unilateral imitation. The case of Comra.de 
has illustrated how an organized business network’s members who are colocated in 
an office building have experienced both friendly and unfriendly imitation. Our 
analysis has shown the imitation of successful solutions from other members. 
Variation leads to a superior position, and imitation gives the company a head start 
when looking for new solutions. Even if the network promotes these collective gains 
from learning, not all of the companies are equally committed to cooperation. In 
particular, members learn from the partners with whom they have worked on earlier 
projects and with whom they have repeatedly exchanged knowledge that can be 
used in the company to solve work-related problems.
What are the consequences for the management of organized networks? Variation 
and imitation in organized networks are an opportunity to reduce the individual’s 
costs of continuous learning. This process can be actively supported if the firms 
manage to share their knowledge and to work together on projects. As Dyer and 
Hatch (2006) ascertained for the automotive industry, a mutual opening of the firm 
is to the advantage of all of the partners. However, a convention of friendly imitation 
is also an opportunity to develop excellent practices for developing common learn-
ing processes and, at a later stage, to establish network goods (Glückler & Hammer, 
2015). Network goods in Comra.de could be joint program databases or organiza-
tional concepts for cooperation based on the division of labor. We argue that aware-
ness of the convention of friendly imitation is a fundamental requirement for 
successful cooperative learning.
However, variation and imitation in physical proximity also allow spillover effects 
from friendly imitation. One of these results was reconstructed in detail in the inter-
views with members. Unfriendly imitation is regarded as a breach of existing con-
ventions, and its effects quickly circulate among members (Coleman, 1988). In the 
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case of Comra.de, the sanctions have been expressed in collective disapproval 
(Weber, 1922/1978) of the member who has broken a taboo. Although the network 
management board or its shareholders at first refrained from tangible sanctions such 
as formal cancellation of membership, the members practiced various forms of soft 
exclusion leading to the deviant member’s isolation from most forms of cooperation. 
That member ended up on the perimeter of the network for cooperative learning and 
finally resigned from the network. The new prevailing semiconvention in the rela-
tionship with this member was legitimacy for both parties to pursue rival learning 
practices. This case illustrates that interfirm collaboration involves a tension between 
cooperation and competition, especially in situations of spatial colocation where the 
actions of others are relatively observable and rather easy to imitate even against their 
consent. The legitimacy of imitation is therefore highly institutionalized in terms of 
conventions and taboos.
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